Edwards wasn’t in love with her!

John Edwards revealed to the public that he has indeed had an affair with Rielle Hunter.  He added that he didn’t love her.

A woman I know responded,  “As if that makes a difference!  So it’s ok now that he didn’t love her?”

Pondering Pastor

Slots Talk from LOPP/Md

The following was prepared by the Lutheran Office of Public Policy – Maryland, Lee Hudson, Director.  The Maryland Legislature has put a slots referendum on November’s ballot.

—-

Slots Talk from LOPP/MD-the Markets

The ELCA social statement “Sufficient, Sustainable Livelihood For All” (1999) objects to gambling as a public revenue source because it’s regressive; it taxes the poor greater than other demographics (page 12). A common rebuttal by gambling proponents is that gambling doesn’t target any demographic; it’s simply a recreational activity on which people chose to spend disposable income.

That’s disingenuous: there’s a gambling industry business plan that understands how to reach and keep its market. Maryland’s current gambling public typifies it. Most money wagered in Prince Georges County on the Maryland Lottery is from lower-income households. It’s similar in other jurisdictions. For state-sponsored gambling to succeed (“success” means achieving revenue projections) that public has to be expanded significantly.

The slots business plan is associated with the propensity of retail gambling to produce addiction. Problem, pathological gambling rates among the general population double out to fifty miles from the sites. The rate is higher among lower income African Americans according to a University of Chicago study. Currently gambling activity is increasing among younger people. Both demographics are target markets for the gambling industry.

For that reason the selection of two sites, at Laurel in Anne Arundel County and at the Harbor in Baltimore City, has been made to realize revenue projections. The Laurel site will get its share of military personnel (a target market) but its real value is its proximity to Prince Georges County and a key demographic density, modest income African Americans. The State’s revenue estimate calls for Laurel to provide $500 million in gambling losses. Baltimore City is expected to produce another $400 million.

The ELCA objection to unfair taxation is legitimate. Central Maryland is supposed to provide $900 million of the projected $1.3 billion in gross slots receipts. The two Central Maryland sites will contribute 70¢ of every dollar the State hopes gamblers lose. Within the gambling demographic retirees, low-income people, young people, and minorities dominate and are abundant around these two sites.

Revenue estimates for those two high volume sites are an assumption based on local minority, retiree, and poverty densities. Baltimore County is a subdivision with a large number of retirees that like to gamble we’re told. It’s assumed many will find their way to the Inner Harbor site; but Baltimore City’s large, minority and poverty demographic will provide a lot of the players. There’s another retired demographic in Montgomery County and considerable discussion has taken place about whether it will find its way to Laurel. It may not; but the Prince Georges County density of preferred demographics will, and revenue assumptions are based on that.

Gambling is an uncomplicated economy: disposable income is spent on the wager transaction. Around each location, slots will compromise local economies. At Rocky Gap and Ocean City, two destinations now billed as family-friendly for instance, slots will consume available disposable income and damage tourist economies. Slots are fed by local, disposable income. That’s why slots increase poverty and decrease local economic activity.

Maryland Slots Referendum

The following was prepared by the Lutheran Office of Public Policy – Maryland, Lee Hudson, Director.  The Maryland Legislature has put a slots referendum on November’s ballot.

———-

Slots Talk from LOPP/MD-the Policy

The ELCA social statement “Sufficient, Sustainable Livelihood For All” (1999) affirmed an historic commitment by this church and its predecessors to adequate and elastic public revenues, and against state-sponsored gambling.¹ To appreciate the ELCA position it is necessary to unpack the hyphenated adjectival “state-sponsored.”

When the state raises revenue from gambling it goes into the business of granting permits for wagering through its regulatory authority. The licenses are contracts between the state and gambling interests to conduct games of chance in return for defined shares of the profits. The state’s share is “revenue.” The gambling industry business model becomes state revenue policy. Revenue will be made dependent on the volume of wagering. That produces two unhappy outcomes.

First, it creates inefficiency-to use a favored economics term-in revenue policy. Rather than revenue being raised directly out of the productive economy an entire industry is created to encourage the wager transaction. In contrast, the sales tax (another levy that wears the label “regressive”) is efficient because it’s in each transaction to which it applies, 6% as revenue. The State’s share of the take in the Maryland gambling plan will be $870 million, but it will only keep $640, about half the plan’s expected $1.3 billion gross receipts. That’s inefficient.

Second, slots will meet the revenue projections if and only if many Marylanders lose a lot of money. It’s estimated that Marylanders now lose about $225 million a year gambling out of state. To achieve revenue estimates from state-sponsored gambling Marylanders will need to lose that $1.3 billion figure. Those losses provide revenue and make Maryland a stakeholder in the business. Maryland must encourage its citizens to frequent slots parlors and lose a lot of money to pay the public bills. That’s poor public policy.

How do slots work? The slots business plan requires customers to stay in the facilities for extended periods; they will be open long hours every day of the year. Slots are profitable because they don’t need attendants: they pay out on a random schedule. The machines no longer use coins. The industry likes credit and bankcards. Typically players stay long enough to win a few times, but over several hours they will lose some too. The business plan has the house make ten cents, on average, from each wagered dollar.

It doesn’t sound like much, but the business plan is about volume. Over the course of an evening you might wager $100. On average you’ll leave with $90. Of the $10 loss, $3.30 goes to the house, $6.70 to the State. If the State expects $870 million…well, you get the point.

Of the revenue raised, $110 million will go to the horse racing industry and about $230 million goes for administrative and public costs, and other subsidies. $640 million will be left as actual “revenue” for the State’s budget.

The slots business model gets married to the State’s public revenue policy, as the State promotes more losses so it can pay its bills. That’s the ELCA objection to state-sponsored gambling.